Since the late 1970s the West Bengal government has implemented comprehensive reforms of agrarian institutions including land reform (land redistribution, tenancy registration) and democratic decentralization (devolution of agricultural development program delivery to elected local governments). We provide an overview of our research findings concerning the accountability of local governments, and impact of their program interventions on farm yields and agricultural incomes. Programs administered by the local governments were reasonably well-targeted to the poor, with few exceptions. Targeting improved as local elections became more contested, and deteriorated with greater socio-economic inequality. The tenancy registration program, distribution of agricultural minikits, IRDP credit and irrigation programs administered by local governments had significant effects on subsequent growth in farm productivity and incomes. The benefits diffused widely among farms within the village, and trickled down to landless agricultural workers in the form of higher wage rates.
Introduction

Background and Motivation
Two-thirds of India's population resides in rural areas, a significant proportion in abject poverty. An important component of Indian economic development therefore involves its villages, embracing growth of agricultural productivity and reduction of rural poverty. While the Green Revolution in the late 1960s and 1970s brought about impressive improvements in farm yields, its scope was limited to a few areas of the country, with benefits (at least initially) limited to medium and large farmers. To a large extent, these outcomes owed to the fact that the Green Revolution at its outset involved an intervention that was mainly technological in nature.
Since the late 1970s, West Bengal has pursued an alternative approach to rural development involving reforms in agrarian institutions, particularly land reform and decentralized governance. These reforms were initiated by a Left Front government which has been in power at the state continuously since 1977. A functioning three tier system of local governments (panchayats) elected every five years was instituted since 1978, well in advance of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in the early 1990s which mandated such a system throughout India. In contrast to most other states (Karnataka and Kerala being notable exceptions), significant responsibilities were devolved to the West Bengal panchayats, including implementation of land reforms, selection of beneficiaries of various development schemes funded by upper level governments, and administration of local infrastructure building programs.
A significant land reform program was administered by panchayats at the block and village levels, involving implementation of land ceilings, distribution of surplus land to the landless, and regulation of tenancy contracts. The magnitude of the land reform effort exceeded other Indian states by a considerable margin: e.g., Appu (1996, Appendix IV.3) estimates over 6.7% of operational land had been redistributed in West Bengal by the early 1990s, in contrast to less than 1% in most other states. Only one other state, Jammu and Kashmir had redistributed more land than West Bengal; no other state has embarked on a tenancy regulation program on a similar scale. Over a million sharecroppers were registered by 1981, up from 242,000 in 1978, and increasing to almost one and a half million by 1990 (Lieten (1992, Table 5 .1)). Registered sharecroppers were protected from eviction and receiving crop shares below mandated minimum levels. The panchayats played a key role in identifying suitable beneficiaries of both kinds of land reform programs. By most accounts, these institutional reforms have transformed the balance of economic and political power away from big landowners and state bureaucrats, towards local governments more responsive to middle farmers and poorer sections of rural society.
Apart from land reform, responsibilities entrusted to the panchayats included selection of beneficiaries of two principal poverty alleviation schemes: the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) which distributed subsidized credit to the poor to enable them to acquire income generating assets, and employment programs such as Food for Work (FFW), National Rural Employment Program (NREP), Rural Labour Employment Guarantee Program (RLEGP) in the 1980s which were merged into the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) from 1989 onwards. They also played a leading role in choosing beneficiaries of other development programs such as farm extension programs, distribution of subsidized agricultural inputs (in the form of minikits containing seeds, fertilizers and pesticides), and miscellaneous welfare schemes (old-age assistance, disaster relief, housing programs for the poor etc.). The panchayats administered construction of local infrastructure (roads, irrigation, public buildings), allocating funds across different projects and subsequently implementing these projects. The bulk of the funds for these programs were devolved to the panchayats under various schemes sponsored by the central and state government. Despite the financing role played by upper level governments, we shall henceforth refer to these programs as provided or administered by the panchayats, to recognize their key role in the delivery process (in contrast to most other Indian states where these programs are implemented almost entirely by state government appointed bureaucrats). 4 These institutional reforms were soon followed by accelerated growth in farm yields and diffusion of high-yielding rice varieties which transformed agricultural growth rates from one of lowest in the country in the 1970s to the highest during the 1980s and the early 1990s (Saha and Swaminathan (1994) ). It is commonly believed that these were the result of the agrarian reform program instituted by the Left Front (see, e.g., Lieten (1992) , Sengupta and Gazdar (1996) ).
Most such assessments are, however, based on post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning, the fact that the productivity changes closely followed the reform program. It is necessary to subject such claims to detailed scrutiny, particularly since the West Bengal experience represents a distinctive egalitarian and democratic approach to rural development, in contrast to 'Washington Consensus' policy approaches. 5 The 'equality-efficiency tradeoff', a central tenet of traditional neoclassical economics, is now increasingly questioned (see e.g., Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) , Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) , Banerjee, Benabou and Mookherjee (2006) , Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis (2000) or Franko (2003) ). The 'new institutional economics' in contrast stresses problems of incentives, information and governance, whereby realignment of property rights in favor of factors or agents with the most acute incentive problems can be growth facilitating. In the context of small-scale agriculture, it is argued by this literature that land reforms awarding greater rights to cultivators can enhance efficiency and growth. Moreover, low accountability of government appointed bureaucrats can result in poor implementation of development programs. It is often argued that these problems may be reduced if elected local governments rather than state government-appointed bureaucrats administer these programs. 6 In order to test these hypotheses empirically, we have undertaken a research project aimed at understanding local political economy determinants of panchayat actions, and the 5 The 'Washington Consensus' is a term frequently used to describe a policy approach based on pro-market reforms and conservative macroeconomic management, espoused for developing countries by multilateral institutions in Washington DC during the 1980s, with the backing of the US Treasury. As elaborated further by Birdsall and de la Torre (2001) or Banerjee, Benabou and Mookherjee (2006) , conspicuously missing from this approach were policies aimed at attacking poverty directly, or institutional changes aimed at improving property rights among the poor or government accountability.
6 For a review of these arguments, see Bardhan and Mookherjee (BM hereafter) (2000 , 2005 , 2006a .
impact of the latter on agricultural productivity and rural poverty, using micro-level farm and village data. This paper provides an overview of the main findings of this project,
summarizing the results of a number of different papers (BM (2004 (BM ( , 2006b (BM ( , 2007 ).
We first review the political economy of local governance in West Bengal: i.e., how accountable were local governments; what were the major determinants of land reform implementation and agricultural input deliveries at the local level? The over-riding concern commonly expressed about a strategy of rural development based on local democracy is the prospect of capture of local governments by rural elites, or their proneness to corruption. In our earlier theoretical work (BM (2000 (BM ( , 2005 (BM ( , 2006a ) we have emphasized that local governments may be more or less prone to corruption than bureaucrats appointed by central or state governments, depending on how well institutions of local democracy function. Hence the relative effectiveness of a strategy of rural development centered on local democracy can be context-specific and for any given setting can only be settled empirically.
Since direct evidence about capture and corruption is difficult to obtain, we can infer these indirectly by studying how land reform implementation and other developmental efforts of panchayats in different West Bengal villages varied with socio-economic inequality and political competition.
The second part of the paper reports estimates of the effects of land reforms and programs administered by local governments on growth of agricultural productivity and the distribution of resulting benefits across different sections of the rural population. These estimates utilize a reduced form difference-of-difference methodology used by Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) , but at a greater level of disaggregation (individual farm yields rather than district averages), with controls for other programs implemented by the panchayats, as well as the possibility that these may have been endogenous. We examine impacts not just on rice yields, but also on cropping decisions, farm incomes, wage rates and employment of hired workers. 5
Summary of Results
Concerning political will of local governments to implement land reforms and target development programs to the poor, our empirical results lead us to reject polar hypotheses that local government officials were motivated by ideology or electoral opportunism alone.
The ideology hypothesis predicts Left dominated panchayats will implement anti-poverty programs more intensively, while the Downsian opportunism hypothesis predicts that the latter will be independent of the political composition of panchayats. Both theories predict there will be greater anti-poverty effort when there is greater inequality and poverty to start with. We find evidence that political composition of panchayats mattered in a number of instances, but not in the way that the ideology hypothesis predicts. Anti-poverty efforts often slackened when the Left became more entrenched, when there was greater local poverty and socio-economic inequality. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that there was some capture of the panchayats by local elites (e.g., medium landowners) or abuse of power among elected officials, apart from strategic manipulation of resource flows to different village panchayats by upper level government bodies. Local election outcomes were explained better by swings in voter loyalty based on events at the national and state levels, rather than changes in the local distribution of land, literacy and caste.
Nevertheless, the extent of political distortions owing to capture varied across different contexts. For instance, within villages, 'private good' programs such as the IRDP credit program or agricultural minikits were well-targeted: more than 95% of these were allocated to small, marginal and landless households. On the other hand, employment generating programs (such as JRY) were administered in a way that less employment was generated out of allotted funds when poverty within the village grew. Higher level panchayats were subject to noticeably greater distortions, with inter-GP allocation of minikits, employment grants and fiscal grants shrinking as poverty and SC/ST proportion within a given GP jurisdiction grew.
Turning to the effects of the land reforms and panchayat programs on agricultural performance, we find that the tenancy registration program had a statistically significant effect on subsequent rice yields and farm value added per acre. Hence the earlier results of Baner- Overall, the results indicate that the land reforms and panchayat administered programs had a favorable impact on agricultural productivity and farm incomes. Unlike the initial impact of the Green Revolution, the benefits were spread widely among small and marginal landowning farms, and trickled down to landless workers.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains different political economy theories of functioning of local governments that structures our analysis. Section 3 describes the empirical results concerning political economy of the West Bengal panchayats, based on two prior papers (Bardhan-Mookherjee (2004 , 2006b ). Sections 4 and 5 presents results of the effects of panchayat actions on farm outcomes: Section 4 summarizes underlying theories and Section 5 our empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Data Description
Summary statistics concerning the villages in our sample are provided in Tables 1 and 2 .
The 89 villages are located in 57 village government (Gram panchayat (GP)) jurisdictions.
Each GP consists of ten to twenty elected members of a council governing administration of the jurisdiction of the GP, which usually consists of eight to fifteen villages or mouzas. On average each district comprises 20 blocks and 200 GPs. Each district (or Zilla) has a single Zilla Parishad (ZP), the top tier of the panchayat system, and each block has a Panchayat Samiti (PS), the middle tier. The top official at each level is an ex-officio member of the next higher level; other officials at each tier are elected directly by voters. For most part, we focus on the composition of seats in GPs as they are the main implementing agencies at the ground level (e.g., with respect to selection of beneficiaries of various developmental schemes and infrastructure projects within villages). Moreover, party composition of GPs and higher tiers were highly correlated with one another.
The twenty year period witnessed four successive elected bodies in each GP, each with a five year term (which we sometimes refer to as a timeblock). The Left Front coalition won an absolute majority in approximately three-fourths of the elected GPs, with a mean seat proportion of 69%. The main opposition party was the Indian National Congress and its various off-shoots (such as the Trinamul Congress which broke away for the 1998 elections).
Most electoral constituencies witnessed a contest between the Left and either the Congress (or the Trinamul Congress): there were hardly any three-way contests. In most cases, these two parties collectively garnered more than 90% of all elected positions. The dominance of the Left Front was greater at higher tiers; e.g., the mean Left share in ZP positions during the period was 86%. Table 2 shows the principal demographic and asset distribution changes in the sample villages between 1978 and 1998. The number of households almost doubled, the result of population growth, household subdivision and in-migration. 7 Illiteracy rates fell, especially among the poor (landless or marginal landowners). The incidence of non-agricultural occupations among household heads rose from 41% to 51%.
The distribution of cultivable non-patta land (i.e., excluding land distributed through the land reforms) changed in interesting ways: landlessness increased, while the distribution of land among landowners became more equal. The proportion of households without any such land or with marginal holdings below a hectare (2.5 acres) increased by almost 10%.
In this sense poverty increased. On the other hand, the proportion of land in small holdings (below 2 hectares) rose by 17%, signifiying a reduction of land inequality among those holding land. These occurred as a result of market sales of land and fragmentation of landholdings accompanying household sub-division. Also distinctive was the involvement of panchayats in this process, who were instrumental in mobilizing mass participation in village meetings to identify ownership of land among households in each village, selecting suitable beneficiaries, and pursuing contested cases through the courts. 9 Table 4 were witnessed in medium and small irrigation projects, many of which were managed by panchayat officials.
8 For instance, Appu (1996, Appendix IV. 3) estimates the proportion of land distributed in Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh by 1992 was less than 1%, and in Bihar Orissa, Haryana, Kerala less than 2%, compared with 6.7% in West Bengal. 9 See Lieten (1992) for a description. Table 5 shows changes over time in cropping patterns and incomes. The most spectacular change was in rice yields which increased two and half times between 1982 and 1995. Part of this is explained by widespread diffusion of high yielding varieties (HYV) of rice, with acreage devoted to such varieties expanding from less than 10% or total rice acreage in 1982 to 39% by 1990, and 66% in 1995. In real terms, farm value added per acre more than doubled. Wage rates for agricultural workers rose by 66%, and employment more than doubled. Since the poorest sections of the rural population are landless and rely mainly on agricultural labor, incomes of the poor rose significantly during this period.
Background and Identification Strategy: Political Economy of Panchayat Program Implementation
Since our analysis concerns the effects of programs implemented by the West Bengal panchayats, it is necessary to provide some background information concerning political motivation of panchayat officials. This is both interesting in its own right, as well as providing the basis of our empirical identification strategy in the analysis of effects of panchayat programs. The first and last columns of Table 6 show that election outcomes in GP elections closely mirrored district-level vote share differences in preceding state assembly elections. Other (Honore (1992) ). Table 7 shows no evidence of any tendency for land reforms to increase monotonically with the Left share of local GP seats. With the exception of the pattaland regression, there was an inverted-U relation instead, statistically significant in the bargadar regression.
Explaining GP Election Outcomes
Land Reform
In the latter regression, the second-last column shows the top turning point of the U appeared at approximately 50% Left share. In other words, once the Left commanded an absolute majority in the local GP, further increases in its seat share reduced rather than increased the proportion of households registered under Operation Barga. This directly contradicts the predictions of the ideology hypothesis (which states that the Left implements more land reform than the Congress owing to its ideological commitments), in favor of the quasi-Downsian hypothesis of electoral competition subject to interest group pressure (Grossman-Helpman (1996) ) or political moral hazard (Bardhan-Mookherjee (2004) ) that political contestability increases redistributive effort. Tables 8, 9 and 10 display implications of village panel regressions for targeting of subsidized credit under the IRDP program, agricultural minikits and fiscal grants to GPs respectively.
Targeting of Other Development Programs
The first three columns of Table 8 show intra-village shares of intended beneficiaries of IRDP loans: landless, small landowning households (owning less than 5 acres of cultivable land), and scheduled castes and tribes (SC/ST). The mean shares of these groups were close to their demographic weights, indicating that on average these schemes were targeted well.
The leakage of IRDP credit to medium and large landowners was small, though roughly in proportion to their demographic weights as well. Examining the effect of varying land inequality, significant effects are observed for the share of the 'upto small' group with a rise in share of land in big holdings, and a particularly strong effect of a rise in proportion of marginal landowning households on the share of the SC/ST group. These findings are consistent with the notion that these villages are characterized by political and economic conflict between three broad classes: big landowners, small and marginal landowners, and agricultural workers (of whom low caste members form a large fraction).
Effects on the inter-GP allocation of credit were generally not statistically significant.
An increase in Left share at the district level (by 10% starting from the mean of 86%) tended to reduce credit allocation to a village, which was statistically significant at 15%. It also resulted in a significant drop in intra-village targeting towards the poor. These results are broadly consistent with the quasi-Downsian theory: as the Left became entrenched in the district, less effort was made to direct IRDP credit to the village and also within the village to the poor. However, effects of altered political competition at the GP level appeared to be insignificant. Table 9 shows corresponding implications for targeting of minikits. The first column shows they were almost exclusively delivered within villages to small and marginal landowning households, rather than medium or big landowners. Moreover, there was almost no effect of changes in land inequality, caste composition or political competition on intravillage targeting. On the other hand, the inter-village allocation responded significantly to land inequality and caste composition, favoring small non-SC/ST households relative to big 13 landowners and SC/ST households. 
Estimating Effects of Panchayat Actions on Farm Outcomes
Effect of Land Reforms: Theoretical Hypotheses
The effect of land reforms on farm productivity have been the topic of a large literature in development economics. The classic arguments concern Marshallian inefficiencies arising from sharecropping, where the share paid to the landlord acts as a tax on the tenant's effort. Sharecropper registration can raise farmer incentives by capping this implicit tax rate. Other incentive effects arise from removing the right of landlords to evict tenants: the direction of these are ambiguous, owing to conflicts between different effects. Eviction threats can be used by landlords as an incentive device, the removal of which could dull tenant incentives. On the other hand, security of tenure may promote longer time horizons for the tenant and thereby increase investment incentives. These issues are discussed in Bardhan (1984) , Dutta, Ray and Sengupta (1989) and Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) .
In addition, registered sharecroppers were eligible to apply for production loans from formal credit channels, which could reduce their interest costs substantially (owing to significant differences in interest rates between formal and informal credit sources). 12
The incentive effects of redistributing land ownership have also been discussed in previous literature (Bardhan (1973) Berry and Cline (1979) , Binswanger et al (1993 ), Mookherjee (1997 ). In general, the effect depends on the extent of economies or diseconomies of scale.
Given the advantages of family labor cultivation over hired labor, and the relative lack of important sources of scale economies (such as mechanization) in rice cultivation, one might expect small farms to be more productive than large farms. While such a pattern has frequently been empirically observed, it has been argued that they may reflect differences in unobserved soil characteristics between small and large farms. If more productive lands are more prone to fragmentation, small farms may be expected to have more fertile soils, in which case observed yield differences between small and large farms overstate the effect of land redistribution programs.
In the West Bengal context however, the patta program mainly concerned distribution of titles to land that had previously been vested (from those holding surplus land above legislated land ceilings). For a subsample of 40 villages for which these data were available, we found that over 70% had been vested prior to 1978. Distribution of already-vested lands would enable them to be actively cultivated instead of lying fallow, in which case one would expect a rise in production yields. Of course these yield improvements would be negligible if the transferred lands were of inferior quality or of very small size. The average size of land parcels distributed in the patta program was approximately half an acre, compared with an average size of 1.5 acres for plots registered under Operation Barga. Moreover, while the latter were cultivable by their very nature, approximately half of all pattas distributed consisted of non-cultivable land. We have also been told by bank officials and farmers that we interviewed that farmers were not eligible for bank loans on the basis of the pattas received in the land reform program, mainly owing to the uneconomically small size and poor quality of the land parcels concerned. Registered tenants were eligible to apply for bank loans. On these groounds, the productivity impact of the patta program is likely to be less significant than the barga program. Results are presented for both physical yields and value added per acre devoted to rice.
Reduced Form Estimates of Impact of Panchayat Actions on Farm Yields
It is notable that the Barga program continues to be a significant determinant of future rice yields, controlling for farm fixed effects and year dummies. This is true both for the OLS and IV regressions, with the IV estimates stronger than the OLS estimates. On the other hand, the effect of the patta program is statistically insignificant for either measure of yield. As explained above, this may owe to the small size of these distributed plots, relative to those registered under the Barga program. In addition, many of the patta plots were not 13 It turns out, however, that the results do not change when they are included in the regression.
14 An additional reason is that any estimate of the registration rate relies on an estimate of the actual number of tenants (registered or otherwise), reliable data regarding which is typically difficult to obtain. cultivable, and could not be used by recipients to apply for bank loans (which sharecroppers could use registration documents to apply for).
Other inputs supplied by GPs, especially GP irrigation programs and IRDP credit, had a significant effect on both measures of yield. Minikits supplied had a significant effect on financial yields, though their effect on physical yields was not statistically significant. The stronger effect on financial returns could reflect effects of minikits supplied by the government on local prices of seeds and fertilizers. State government provided roads had a strong positive effect throughout, while state canal irrigation exhibited a negative, significant effect. 17 Table 12 shows corresponding impacts on farm value added per acre, aggregating across all crops. This captures the total effect on farm incomes, including induced changes in cropping patterns as well as returns to different crops. The results are similar to those of rice yields, which is not surprising given the importance of rice which occupies nearly two thirds of total cropped area in our sample. Table 13 examines differential effects on productivity and incomes of small (less than 5 acre) and marginal (less than 2.5 acre) farms. These are generally insignificant, with the exception of IRDP credit supply which increased yields of marginal farms relative to other farm sizes. Therefore the yield improvements were spread evenly across farms of disparate size.
Finally, Table 14 examines the impact on wage and employment rates of agricultural workers hired by farms. The IV estimates show a significant positive impact of barga registration and minikit supplies on wage rates, while none of the panchayat programs had a significant effect on employment rates. This may reflect a decline in the supply of agricultural labor (owing to income effects among marginal landowners who usually 17 This result may reflect uneven release of water from the state canals alleged by many farmers. In interactions with several farmers, we were told that excessive water was released in times of excess rainfall, which may have damaged crops. An additional possibility is that state canal provision responded to the political and economic power of large landowners, which was negatively correlated with local productivity of the average small or marginal farm. Another is that the state government directed canal expansion into slow-growing areas for redistributive reasons.
supplement their farm earnings on the labor market), in combination with increased demand for labor from larger farms associated with increases in cropped areas. 18
The quantitative impact of Operation Barga on yields turns out to be somewhat smaller, though of the same order of magnitude, as that estimated by Banerjee et al (2002) . The coefficients in Table 12 combined with the extent of observed changes in land registered under the Barga program in Table 3 imply that the latter explain about 5% increase in farm value added per acre. Banerjee et al (2002) estimated a 20% impact on rice yields for a similar period, which is consistent with our findings since we control for many other panchayat interventions that were correlated with land reform implementation. Moreover, the changes in distributed kits, credit and irrigation expenditures predict yield increases that are substantially larger than the effects of Operation Barga. A rough back-of-theenvelope calculation indicates these were of the order of 500%, 140% and 6% respectively. 19
This owes essentially to the substantially smaller scale of the land reform, compared with supplies of other agricultural inputs delivered by panchayats. In BM (2007) we also show that tenancy registration did not have a significant effect on proportion of cropped area devoted to HYV rice, whereas the minikits distributed did; the latter explained most of the observed changes in HYV rice adoption rates. Similar results were obtained with respect to wage rates: most of the observed changes were explained by the minikits distributed, while the contribution of the tenancy registration program was negligible.
Concluding Comments
To summarize our main results, we found some evidence in favor of the quasi-Downsian theory stressing the proneness of electoral competition to elite capture, with respect to the pro-poor accountability of West Bengal local governments. Local inequality and po-18 In BM (2007) it is shown that Operation Barga and minikits supplied had a strong positive impact on total cropped area.
19 Specifically, these are the growth in farm value added per acre that would be predicted in a hypothetical village where land registered under Operation Barga, minikits, credit supplied or panchayat irrigation expenditures increased in the same way as the average across all villages in our sample, weighted by their operational areas of cultivation.
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litical competition mattered in the way that this theory predicts. These were especially pronounced in the case of the barga program, in the treatment of SC/ST groups with respect to IRDP credit, the administration of employment programs by GPs, the inter-village allocation of minikits, employment grants and fiscal grants by higher levels of government.
There was relatively less indication of elite capture in intra-village allocation of private goods (except with respect to treatment of SC/ST groups) and in the implementation of land reform; hence local democracy seemed to have functioned well in regard to these programs.
We also found evidence of the importance of the actions of GPs for growth in farm productivity: the barga program, supplies of IRDP credit and agricultural kits, local investments in irrigation and roads contributed to the rise in rice yields and farm productivity during the 1980s and 90s. Unlike the initial impact of the Green Revolution in earlier decades elsewhere in the country, these benefits flowed uniformly to both small and large farms, with substantial trickle down to landless agricultural workers in the form of higher wage rates.
We do not, however, interpret the effects of the Barga program in terms of conventional explanations in terms of sharecropper incentives to apply effort or invest. As explained in further detail in BM (2007), our data exhibits no direct evidence of classic sharecropping distortions: tenancy per se is not associated with lower yields, controlling for farm fixed effects and year dummies. Moreover, the Barga program had no discernible effect on the impact of tenancy on yields. Less than 10% of farms in our sample leased in land, and the observed impacts of different panchayat programs are almost the same when the sample is restricted to pure owner-cultivators. This indicates that the measured impacts reflect some village-wide impact of the panchayat interventions. A better understanding is needed of the process by which productivity improvements appeared and diffused -changes in prices of key inputs such as credit, seeds or fertilizers, social learning, collective action within the village with respect to minor irrigation, induced effects on farm sizes owing to land fragmentation through household division or transactions on the land market, or on the accountability of government officials.
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Overall, we find evidence supporting the view that land reform and devolution of program delivery to local governments in West Bengal stimulated growth of farm productivity, and that the benefits diffused widely across different segments of the rural population. We cannot, however, assess the relevance of these findings for other Indian states with contrasting historical traditions and agricultural settings. Concerning policy implications for West Bengal, our analysis suggests greater attention be placed on the process of disbursement of grants at higher levels of the panchayat system across GPs. In addition, policy-makers should be sensitive to instances of perverse intra-village targeting with regard to employment generating programs administered by GPs, and treatment of SC/ST groups. Measures to enhance electoral competition -e.g., institutional reforms that reduce incumbency advantages, such as the scope for manipulation of electoral outcomes by current governments -are also likely to enhance accountability of local governments. Also included: timeblock dummies, village fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses ***:significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
